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CHINA 2020: LOOKING FORWARD
by

J. A. English-Lueck
"The present is never our destination, the past and present arc
only our means, the future alone is our destination." [Quotation
of Blaise Pascal by Zhao Fusan, vice-chairman of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, at the lOth World Federation
Conference of the World Futures Federation in Beijing, 1988]
(Huang, 1988).
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In November 1988 I began to conduct interviews with various scholars
in a key university in Southwestern China concerning the future of Chinese
education, science and modernization. China is a planned society, with
ideologically defined goals outlining the shape of the future, if only hazily
and distantly perceived. What do Chinese scholars, a group emerging
tentatively from the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, think about the
possibilities facing China? How do those perceptions reveal structural
features of Chinese society?
China's role in the consideration of the future is doubly significant.
First, China represents a fifth of humanity, and her version of the future
should surely be better understood by Western futurists. Secondly, the field
of futures studies is heavily dominated by the perspective of the developed
world, especially the West. Too often, future scenarios are thinly veiled
exercises in self-projection, middle-class intellectual America writ large.
Hence my decision to undertake cross-cultural futures research. China can
also further our understanding of a methodological issue in futurism--the
role of planning. The benefits and trials of a planned society are hotly
debated in futures conferences, as a matter of speculation.
Yet an
ethnographic analogy exists today--there are highly planned societies, such
as China. How does planning shape the perception and reality of alternative
futures?
I chose the Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) technique (Textor,
1980) as my methodological tool. Through an open-ended interview
format, the interviewer elicits an individual's concept of the best, worst and
most probable scenario of a particular future. The individual is encouraged
to describe freely the future in question, in this case the future of science,
education and society in China in A.D. 2020. Sometimes I would couch
this future in personal terms--what will your 4 year old son's life be like in
the University when he is 34? What will your life be like in the University
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when you are 60? This approach was used only when needed to elicit
responses--usually such detailed probing was unnecessary. In addition, each
interview report contains a brief biographical sketch, intended to give some
personal context that would help interpret the information. For example,
if a person had been sent to the Chinese countryside in the 1970s, this
would illuminate any opinions that person might have on the rural/urban
split, or for that matter, on the power of the policy-makers who sent him
there. The interview is primarily an exercise in scenario building--highly
fruitful for revealing values (what is desired, feared, etc.) as well as those
issues in the ethnographic present that seem relevant to the interviewee in
determining the shape of the future, such as economic policy in the
educational system of China. I had used this technique with great success
with American holistic healers, midwives, legal personnel and educators.
However, I had no experience using the technique cross-culturally.
The Chinese who agreed to be interviewed consisted of scholars from all
over China studying temporarily in Southwestern China. Although self
selected, and motivated by the opportunity to practice their English with a
native speaker, they proved to be a relevant and accessible group. I
conducted 103 interviews from November 1988 to January 1990. The
interviews fell into 3 field seasons, November 1988-January 1989, June
1989, and December 1989 to January 1990. Only a few interviews were
carried out in June 1989, because I felt that further research would be
inappropriate and uncomfortable for my potential interviewees in view of
the turmoil of that time. Thus the bulk of the information comes from the
winters of 1988/1989 and 1989/1990. All interviewees were asked to give
some basic background (all names and work units were edited out in
transcription). Prompting with a fan-like diagram depicting the various
alternatives (worst to best) stemming from the present, I asked the scholars
to talk about the future of Chinese science, particularly science education,
and the impact of science and technology on Chinese society. In practice
these domains often were generalized to science, education and society.

METHODOLOGICAL TRIBULATIONS
The cross-cultural context highlighted some methodological questions I
had already encountered--such as the issue of analytical reciprocity, how to
interpret the responses of the interviewees. Moreover, some difficulties
were generated directly by the problems of doing Chinese futures fieldwork.
The interviews were quite different in style and content from anything I had
encountered in their American counterparts. There were some interesting
limitations in applying the EFR technique in this context, including factors
such as language, openness, temporal preconceptions and timing.
In general, any scenario-building technique presents some difficulties for
analysis. Since the scenarios are a product of spontaneous creativity and
free association, rarely are they tidily organized in easily understood
categories--relevant current events, best scenarios, most pessimistic
scenarios, etc. Instead, as ideas occur to the respondents, they may
comment on these issues, even if it is inconvenient for the overall
6
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organization. This problem is often easy to adjust for in the transcription
phase. However, it implies a methodological question that is not so easily
resolved, for social scientists must analyze not only what is said, but what
is left unsaid. As I outlined and tabulated observations on the best and worst
scenarios I pondered once again the nature of the scenarios I was building.
If a person mentions a feature of the optimistic scenario, will its opposite
automatically be implied in the pessimistic scenario? Can we assume a
reciprocity of worldview--P is favored, Q is the opposite of P, so Q must
be negatively valued? Are our projected realities really that consistent?
After all, few other aspects of human behavior are consistent! If someone
states that population control will determine the success of China's
economy, it is fairly clear what he means. I can easily determine this
factor in his optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. However, if someone
says that the increase in privacy will break down the network of relations
that maintains Chinese society, is she implying that the best future will
minimize privacy? Particularly since this interpretation of values runs
counter to my American branch of ethnocentrism, can I really be sure I
understand what she means? How do we deal, methodologically, with
retrospective implications?
Of course, many of the difficulties I encountered in my fieldwork were
a function of doing cross-cultural research, particularly in China. The first
difficulty is language. Since my Chinese is good primarily for buying
vegetables, not conducting sophisticated discourse on social issues, the
interviews were conducted in English. This had both advantages and
disadvantages. Clearly, my main disadvantage was the inaccessibility of the
vast number of Chinese scholars who spoke only Chinese, or perhaps
French or Russian. In addition, the interviewees, whose English level was
advanced, were still constrained by the inability to express themselves at
their native intellectual level, but at the same time they were liberated by
speaking in code--things can be said in English that would not be uttered in
Chinese. A translator would be out of the question since that would
eliminate any attempt at anonymity, which was vital to ensuring coopera
tion.
Unlike my American informants, Chinese scholars are unused to
expressing personal opinions freely, especially to foreigners. Often the best
observation would go unrecorded since the interviewee would not want to
be linked with the observation. My rapport was sufficient to get fairly cre
ative responses, but it was clear that many individuals, particularly the older
scholars, were insecure, or even afraid to respond with any direct personal
opinion. I had to respect their concern. In addition, politeness may dictate
that nothing would be said that might disturb the American guest. This
occasionally left me with the feeling of being invisibly second-guessed as
the interviewees would carefully watch my responses to see if they were
answering "correctly", that is, in a way that would not offend me. This
concern was one reason I decided to get a large number of interviews (at
least by qualitative, anthropological standards) to see a greater variety of
opmton.
The next perceptual screen I had to pierce was determining to what extent
Futures Research Quarterly • Fall 1990
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the opinion was truly individual. Could I detect a "rhetoric factor", an
interpretation of social events in accordance with the current governmental
policy? Surely the concordance of information and issues between
interviews and the People's/China Daily was not entirely coincidence.
Determining the larger social values is the whole point of the EFR
technique, but in China social judgements may reflect a consciously
articulated governmental policy. In any EFR interview, there is a key
moment when the shape of the most probable future emerges. How is it
like the optimistic scenario, or the pessimistic? In the 1988/1989 inter
views, the response was overwhelming. All but one individual said the
most probable future was only slightly less wonderful than the optimistic
one (even though the details of the scenario might be contradictory to that
assessment). Moreover, although the content of the best and most probable
futures was more guardedly optimistic in the winter 1989/1990 interviews,
it was also optimistic in the long view, after another decade or so of
difficult times. Of course, within Marxism (as well as indigenous Chinese
philosophies) there is the idea of an inherently brighter future. "Progress
is inevitable", stated several intellectuals. There is a conscious effort in
Chinese political rhetoric to emphasize this idea (whether the progress will
reach fruition in 10 years or 200 is often subject to debate). Such overt
optimism was inevitable. What was interesting was the degree to which
individual answers belied the generalization. The theme was "Yes, the
future will be better, but realistically, it won't be glorious quite so easily".
This was particularly noticeable in the interviews after June 1989. The
interplay between rhetoric and analytical foresight is a fruitful area of
exploration.
The events of June 1989 caught many foreign Sinologists by surprise
(Coughlin, 1989). Yet the Chinese intellectual community Was slowly
stirring before that time (see also Jacobson, 1989). The interviews came
at a unique moment in recent Chinese history, at the edge of discontent-
half of them at a time when freedom seemed greater than in anyone's
memory; half at a time of greater caution. It was far easier to get personal
opinions in 1989/1989 than in 1989/1990, for reasons of realpolitik and
methodology (the openness factor again). Recently, the official rhetoric
concerning the arrival of a bright future has been revised--it has been
postponed potentially for several generations. The role of intellectuals has
been defined more keenly--the scholars must realize they are workers in the
service of the state. These factors have made the generation of an
optimistic future, comparable to the developed world, more hesitant and
decidedly more realistic. The future would still be brighter than today, so
the scholars believed--but the timeframe would be longer and the path uphill
steeper than anticipated.
Beyond the purely methodological questions, the EFR technique readily
yielded patterns that are worth discussing here. The concerns of over
whelming interest to futurists--the fate of the developing world, the issue
of planned and unplanned societies, the concerns of the group championing
Chinese modernization, i.e. the intellectuals-- can also be explored.
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EMERGENT THEMES--POWER, PLANNING AND SURVIVAL
In the EFR interview, one gets a sense of not only the array of alterna
tives in a given framework, but also the values--hopes and fears--of the
interviewee, as well as a description of those current issues that will shape
the future. When the rural Chinese construct a building, they lay earth
bricks over a primary framework. One of the difficult jobs in analyzing the
EFR interviews is separating the framework from the bricks.
The
following ideas, repeated over and over, may be part of that framework.
One critical difference between my American and Chinese interviewees
is the locus of control. Any American informants might cite economics,
ideology, the supernatural, or luck as the agent of change, but always with
a clear idea of the role of an individual as an actor. "In the future, we will
be able to ... " is a common pattern. Not so in this Asian set of interviews.
There is only one locus of control, the government, more specifically, the
government's policies, not the laws, but the ever changing images of the
near future. In futurist circles we often debate the merits of planned
societies, forgetting that we have models of such societies in the world
today. Repeatedly the informational distance and mercurial nature of
central planning leaves a gnawing sense of frustration. Not only the
workplace is assigned, but also the content of scientific work, based not on
the scholar's education, interest or personal convenience, but on Beijing's
outline of what is needed from science and technology in the immediate
future. The plans are often either over-generalized, thus not including
diversity or concrete goals, or over-specified, thus not allowing for regional
variation or lack of infrastructure. This may give rise to some kind of
failure, or the threat of failure, of the individual scientist, engineer or
middle-level manager trying to implement the goal. In the interviews,
virtually no one expressed the desire for complete freedom of choice, but
instead a desire to "deregulate" and find greater freedom of choice within
the larger policy guidelines of the central government.
There was also a consciousness of the profound problems facing China
as a developing country, particularly those issues emphasized by the
government, such as population control, rural/urban divergence and possible
emergence of a class distinction, and insufficient education. Such global
considerations are an appropriate focus for futurists, since they represent
the real world constraints on the shape of the future. Once again, pre
existing rhetoric was a clear influence on the declaration of the problems
by interviewees.
Although personal experience was clearly a more
profound factor than such rhetoric, such issues as the success of the one
child policy (although never a critical analysis) or the increasingly obvious
differences between the cities and the countryside were mentioned. On a
more subtle level, there were long-standing rhetorical connections that
caught me off-guard. For example, I was surprised, though perhaps I
should not have been, that when I asked about science I frequently got
responses about democracy. Why? Science and democracy were coupled
in the educational development of early 20th century China as well as the
Futures Research Quarterly • Fall 1990
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historic May 4th movement in 1919. They are coupled in rhetoric as well
as in logic--things dealing with greater accessibility of information.
Personal experience was overwhelmingly the source of information on
change and trouble in Chinese society. All of the scholars interviewed had
a university education, most were teachers as well as practicing engineers
or researchers, some of whom had worked in primary and secondary educa
tion in the countryside during and after the Cultural Revolution. At that
time the status of intellectuals was low, just next to that of beggars. An
effort was made to give them more prestige, and they are now officially
workers, i.e. the good guys.
Their concern with educational futures was intimate. The interviews
revealed the conflicts inherent in a developing country, such as the budget
and priority battle between mass education and elite development of science
and technology. The lack of infrastructure and facilities (what use is a
supercomputer if the electricity is not dependable?) was a consistent con
cern. The poor material living conditions and the low morale of educators
were the most common issues discussed in the interviews. Lack of broad
support and empty coffers has led to a chronic undersupport of teachers.
A young scholar working in the university makes 90--100 yuan monthly.
To put that into perspective, a chicken costs 15 yuan, a bicycle 250-300
yuan. Fixing shoes is far more lucrative.
In the past decade of economic reforms, the perception has been that to
be rich is glorious (even if this creed is officially revoked in the future, it
is well established in the minds of the youth), and teachers are de facto
inglorious. This has led to a crisis of morale. Coupled with the lack of
facilities and genuine research opportunities--there is a sense that research
now is mundane and filled with duplication (how many space heaters can
be designed?)--it is amazing to this Western observer that there is any
optimistic scenario, but the majority of the interviewees felt policies would
change in 30 years and more people would want to go and could go to
universities. Although some scholars pointed out the crisis of money and
morale in education in the countryside in their pessimistic scenarios, others
pointed out that education remained a main avenue of social mobility, even
if the economic payoff was low.
An intellectual is an official, albeit
usually not a high one, and the move to the urban sector may otherwise
prove impossible for a member of a rural family in a society where
residence is governmentally controlled. Many felt that education would
proceed along two separate paths of vocational, practical training, especially
in the countryside, and advanced theoretical work.
In scientific education, often the greatest projected advance would be in
those fields that do not need sophisticated technology, such as math and
theoretical physics, or in those areas on the cutting edge--superconductors,
computers, genetic engineering. Perhaps, scholars speculated, in those
fields China would not be bogged down by existing lack of infrastructure
and it could co-opt the latest nanotechnology. In spite of this optimism, it
was also noted that neither theoretical research nor advanced research,
which might require a large amount of foreign hard capital for equipment,
was a high priority in educational policy. Not everyone lauded the coming
10
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of an age of high technology. Some scholars dismissed higher level
education, emphasizing that as long as the rate of rural illiteracy was
astronomical, building the upper end would only accelerate the creation of
two Chinas, a neolithic rural and a 21st century urban sector.

FUTURE IMAGES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
In my previous work with American informants I had been struck with
the way in which visions of the future played a large part in fuelling social
movement ideology. I had particularly noted the way in which holistic
health practitioners revealed New Age expectations in the EFR interviews
(English-Lueck, 1990). Although I had not anticipated tapping into social
movement sentiment in my interviews with Chinese scholars, I might well
have done so. China's modernization effort is not simply building more
concrete structures and the occasional Weaver Girl rocket. Western ideas
have accompanied the technology. Youth culture has revived elements of
traditional Chinese arts and practices, as well as embracing jeans, rock
music and a new cultural independence from the tyranny of an age-grade
system in which the elders are unquestionably in the right. Although more
conservative than the "waiting to work" set, intellectuals, particularly
students, have adopted the values that inadvertently accompanied the
opening of China in the last decade. The stage is set for a truly New
China. How do these attitudes appear at the individual level, which is often
invisible?
It has been lamented by students of social movements (Gerlach and Hine,
1981) that it is difficult to study a social movement in its early phases,
before a crisis alters the worldview that highlights the visible features of the
movement. For example, the 1968 Santa Barbara oil spill and Chemobyl
disaster forever changed the perceptions and activities of the anti-nuclear
and environmental movments. After all, most people do not study a social
movement until after a crisis has crystallized that movement into a visible
social entity. The EFR technique did reveal the stresses inherent in the
system, before the events of June forever altered the visible efforts of
Chinese intellectuals to effect change. After June 1989, in events better
described by journalists than anthropologists, the outside image of the
distress felt by the Chinese has been altered permanently in our perceptions.
It is analytically very difficult now to separate the events of the "turmoil"
in Beijing and other urban centers of China from the grassroots concerns
of the relevant segment of Chinese society, the intellectuals. Understand
able affective reactions and oversimplifications based on the highly visible
turmoil of the 1989 May and June movement--i.e. the Western perception
of a Chinese "yearning for democracy", or a causative factor of "outside
agitators"--color, and perhaps obscure, any analysis.
Although my
interviewees did not march in the streets of Beijing, they had earlier
expressed concern with the issues that the demonstrators highlighted-
concern for corruption and emergent class distinctions and an increased
desire for freedom of expression, within a planned centralized system. If
social changes are lurking in the background of the collective consciousness
Futures Research Quarterly • Fall 1990
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of the Chinese intellectual, perhaps it would be useful to go back and
reexamine their optimistic scenarios, the ones that I suspect contain the
deepest motivation for change. The more widespread and opaquely visible
message might be that Chinese intellectuals desire a materially prosperous
future--although few would expect parity with the developed world--in a
centrally guided stable political environment where laws and not policies
prevail and where each individual has increased ability to make moral and
other life decisions. This vision is accompanied by an overall sense of na
tionalism, i.e, a deep desire to retain and regain Chinese heritage. This
was partially undermined during the attempted ethnosuicide of the Cultural
Revolution and is now overshadowed by the ideology and economic influ
ence of imported worldviews.
Planning, rhetoric, and personal experience shaped the images of China's
future. Primarily an Americanist by training, I was deeply struck by the
constraints--economic, structural and practical--on the Chinese intellectual.
Doing futures research cross-culturally has presented some unique problems
but also yielded insights into my own preconceptions and biases. The
future is not simply a projection of Middle-America with nifty gadgets--an
image I feel sometimes pervades futurism--but reflects a complex set of
widely divergent patterns, some of which are alien indeed.
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